THE GREEK CONTRIBUTION TO CFSP AND CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the Cold War and with it the end of all the givens in International Relations. The abolition of Bipolarity was a major movement of Tectonic Plates and as the world searches for a new sense of balance, a cluster of new problems and challenges has risen. Events in Eastern Europe set in motion dramatic changes in the shape of the European Security Architecture. The European Union (EU) faced with radically altered international stage, was forced to reevaluate and revise its policies and practices in order to address these new challenges.

Among these, prominent is the challenge of maintaining peace and security on the European Continent and its periphery. Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) is the latest addition to the faculty of policy instruments available to the EU countries for addressing challenges in the post 9/11 precarious world environment.

This paper will attempt to provide a case study by sketching how a comparatively seasoned member of the EU such as Greece has coped with the relatively new concept of EU CCM as well as portray the challenges, opportunities and difficulties that lie ahead.

The analysis will proceed in two parts. The first part provides a brief overview of the development on the field of EU CCM. In the second part the approach is two-fold. First, it focuses on the changing nature of CCM and how Greece has dealt with it. Second, it examines the Greek contribution to conflict prevention.

EU Civilian Crisis Management

Since its inception, the EU has been involved in conflict prevention and crisis management. In order for the EU to respond to the need for outside intervention in areas of crises, it set out procedures for civilian and military crisis management. The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam introduced and expanded what became known at the time as the second pillar i.e. policy instruments for politico/diplomatic, security/military action under the guise of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/ European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The European Councils in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), Feira (June 2000) and Goteborg (June 2001) have concluded that the EU should develop the ability to undertake the full range of Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union (Petersberg Tasks) through the development of the full range of civilian and military means at its disposal[1].

CCM is a relatively new concept born out of the manifest and inherent inability of military organizations in dealing with post-conflict reconstruction and development as well as larger issues as restoration of the rule of law, good governance etc.

International experience with crisis management over the last decade has shown a change in the nature and scale of crises, with which the EU must deal. The EU has to deal these days with the existence of failed states and bloody civil wars in its periphery. In this new environment the military and the civilian

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[*] The paper was presented by Ms. Eleni Demiri and Mr. Evangelos Vlioras at the international conference "Regional Dimensions of the CFSP/ESDP of the EU" within the framework of the European Foreign Policy Research Network (FORNET) project, in Sofia, 1-2 October 2004.

[1] For an overview, see documents on the Civilian Crisis Management page of the official EU internet site – http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cm.htm

approach to crisis management should work in tandem. These developments pose challenges for the EU. Among these, foremost is the challenge of setting new targets for CCM and ensuring the effectiveness of the policy tools and decision-making procedures in our disposal.

Crisis management instruments

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) operating since March 2000 can be viewed as an important innovation for crisis management activities. In short, the PSC recommends "a cohesive set of options" to the Council whilst at the same time it observes the implementation of measures adopted and exercises "political control and strategic direction" in cases of military operations (European Council 2000b).

Regarding civilian capabilities, the PSC is supported and advised by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) set up in May 2000, consisting of experts from national ministries[2]. At the Feira European Council, four areas for CCM were established: Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection (European Council 2000a). Emphasis has been given to the development of the Police leg. The main aim of identifying a pool of 5000 police officers, 1000 of which would belong to the Rapid Reaction Force able to deploy in 30 days, has been accomplished[3]. The first actual deployment took place in 1/1/2003 when the EUPM replaced the IPTF in Bosnia[4].

In relation to the Rule of Law, the EU aims at building capabilities in order to send civilian personnel on international missions. To this end, great emphasis has been placed on setting up a pool of experts for all aspects of public administration (prosecutors, judges etc.) providing civil protection teams, which shall in particular assist humanitarian actors (e.g. search and rescue, construction of refugee camps, logistical support, establishing communication systems) (Kintis, 2002, p. 293).

With regard to civilian administration, the EU is identifying aspects and key areas for support in crisis management such as election monitoring, taxation, education etc.[5]. Where civil protection is concerned, the EU has set up a coordination mechanism for enhancing the efficiency of national civil protection agencies, a timely move in the wake of 9/11.

Rapid reaction mechanism

The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is a relatively recent addition to the EU's crisis management arsenal. The RRM is essentially a funding mechanism designed to alleviate the economic consequences brought about by violent conflict, thus facilitating crisis management (International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 6). The RRM has proven to be considerably less cumbersome than regular EU procedures for donating aid and channels its funds through NGOs and international organizations. Although its budget is small (35 million euro) it has been used in a number of instances in Afghanistan, the DRC and FYROM. The success story of the RRM proves that the EU's miniscule aid budget can go a long way in establishing good will in aid countries. The EU can cash in this good will dividend by increasing stability in its periphery.

Conflict prevention

The Cologne European Council placed crisis management at the center of the CFSP agenda. The best way of avoiding a crisis management exercise is to address the root causes of conflict and that is where the EU's Conflict Prevention Policy comes into the fray. The list of policy tools for conflict prevention at the EU's disposal is long: Humanitarian Aid, Commercial Policy, Political Dialogue, and Cooperation with NGOs etc.

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[2] For a detailed analysis see Kintis, 2002, p. 289.
[3] European Commission (2001), *Developing new capabilities for Civilian Crisis Management* available on the official EU internet site, page on Civilian Crisis Management – http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cm.htm
[4] Ibidem
[5] European Commission (2001), *Developing new capabilities for Civilian Crisis Management* available on the official EU internet site, page on Civilian Crisis Management – http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cm.htm

In this framework the Commission circulated its communiqué on conflict prevention[6] outlining the goals of the EU's conflict prevention policy namely:

- Coordination and systematic use of the EU's resources;
- Eradication of the root causes of conflict;
- Enhancing the Union's ability to intervene in conflict-ridden areas;
- Promoting cooperation with international organizations and NGOs;

The Goteborg European Council approved a program for Prevention of armed conflict. On the basis of that program, the Commission the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) to include conflict prevention aspects (European Council, 2001). This means that when CSPs are drawn up, the Commission uses a number of conflict indicators to assess the situation.

The Seville European Council went a step further and declared that weapons non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control regimes can have a positive influence of conflict prevention and the Union shall do its utmost to undertake such efforts (European Council, 2002).

At the level of crisis management, the main aim of the EU is to support a comprehensive approach integrating the capabilities and operational framework in all four areas (police, rule of law, civil protection, public administration). The military and civil aspects of ESDP should be developed on a parallel and equal basis given that they are integrated in a unified action plan. Special emphasis should be given to politico-military coordination, financing participation of third countries and cooperation with international and regional organizations and NGOs[7]. This comprehensive approach is the fundamental difference between EU and NATO crisis management and sets the basis for the autonomy of these two organizations.

The EU has already considerable experience and some successes in the field of conflict prevention. The EU's preventive diplomacy has a great scope for extending its action on the basis of international legitimacy and UN Resolutions. This action would be more effective if the EU coordinates its voice in international organizations further. The EU as the biggest donor of aid can further coordinate all its external actions to serve the aims of preserving and extending democratic practices, good governance and respect for Human Rights. Furthermore, the EU's greatest leverage in the field of conflict prevention is that its periphery and third countries perceive the EU as an area of security, rule of law, accountable democratic public institutions and protection for minorities. EU conflict prevention efforts must be focused in specific volatile regions such as the Balkans and the Euro-Med area.

Greece and Civilian Crisis Management

Greece's case is typical of a middleweight country in a EU-25 with modest means that tries to walk the straight and narrow, promoting the community method and believing in the EU as a security actor and not a debating society. Greek attitudes towards CFSP/ESDP edifice and EU CCM and conflict prevention in particular reflect the perception that the EU reacts rather than acts and that on the basis of the lowest common denominator. The prevailing view in Greece seems to point towards taking steps to remedy the situation rather than abandoning the existing framework altogether (Frangakis, Papayannides and Vlioras, 2003, (p. 2).

The new security agenda in the post 9/11 environment demands effectiveness, swiftness and coherence in foreign policy[8]. Europe cannot address these challenges without reconfiguring its foreign policy/security architecture. The missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM and the Democratic Republic of Congo although undoubtedly steps in the right direction, seem to indicate that the whole process is going through its childhood illness phase, faced with budgetary and other concerns.

[6] European Commission (2001), *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, Brussels, COM (11/04/2001) 211 final- http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf
[7] Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003), *The Priorities of the Greek Presidency*, online article, http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/the_presidency.html
[8] See SOLANA, Javier (2003), *A secure Europe in a better world*, Report to the European Council, Thessaloniki 20 June 2003, http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_3087_en.htm

In the field of crisis management, Greece supports the updating of Petersberg Tasks to include tasks that require military resources[9]. The existing description of Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty covers a great range of missions, both quality and quantity wise. However the post 9/11 environment has shifted radically European threat perceptions and defence requirements. The Petersberg Tasks description should be amended to include new requirements such as conflict prevention, disarmament, dispatching of military advisors abroad to provide training as well as post-conflict stabilisation and assisting government authorities in combating terrorism.

Greece's driving force and impetus for promoting EU CCM is in no way different from that of other EU member-states. Greece views its participation in EU civilian crisis management and conflict prevention through the prism of its EU membership and as beneficial to the country's national interests. It is in fact in Greece's direct national interest to do its utmost in order to enhance the security of its periphery. The end of the Cold War affected Greek Security perceptions in a big way. Although its strategic value was probably enhanced, the country was faced with considerable fluidity and uncertainty in its periphery. In the last decade, a series of new risks have emerged in Greece's immediate security environment, namely the Balkans and the Mediterranean basin. Proximity to the conflict areas and the fear that instability would inhibit the country's ongoing integration with the European mainstream created a deep-seated sense of vulnerability[10]. To deter threats to its security Greece relies on internal (Strong Armed Forces) and external balancing agencies (participation in NATO, EU, OSCE) (Dokos, 2003). In recent years, Greece has evolved from a firm, but rather reserved supporter to an active participant of Peace support operations. Therefore, Greece does its bit by contributing personnel and resources to crisis management[11].

Although Greece is a newcomer in the field of CCM unlike the Nordic member-states, who are after all the founding fathers of the non-military crisis management concept in the EU, it has accumulated a useful volume of experience over the past decade. The Greek Constitution and national Security Doctrine do not preclude or impose restrictions on the country's participation in international crisis management operations, including the use of force.

Greece's approach to crisis management is that of complementarity between the military and civilian track of EU CCM without atrophying one facet in order to divert all resources to the other. The Greek approach to EU crisis management is based on the assumption that in the post Cold War World-laughingly dubbed as new world disorder- crises can no longer be tagged, branded, categorized and easily referenced as either strictly military or civilian in nature, but rather contain elements of both. The crises of our present and tomorrow require a multi-faceted coordinated response with both military and non-military means. The fact of the matter is that these two dimensions are so blurred into each other that drawing a clear distinction is a virtual impossibility.

At the moment, there is something of a dichotomy among those member-states who promote the endowing of the EU with strong military means for crisis management reserving a second fiddle place for the non-military aspects, and those countries that have strong reservations about the use of force. In this respect, civilian military coordination and adequate task allocation and sharing between these components has become a key factor in modern crisis management operations.

Greek current mission experiences and institutional memory are primarily military, since the civilian track of crisis management started somewhat later. In fact, Greek participation in peace support operations around the world has been quite significant and disproportionate to the size of its armed forces and defence expenditure. As of February 2004 there are 1400 members of the Greek armed forces serving overseas in peace support operations under UN, OSCE, EU or NATO mandate[12].

Greek armed forces have pioneered the use of military resources for post-war reconstruction work and disaster relief undertaking such projects in places as far apart as Somalia, Bosnia and Afghanistan.

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[9] *Agence Europe*, Kostas Simitis calls for Political Union and decentralized federalism and stresses importance of social cohesion, 04/02/2002.

[10] The literature on Greek foreign policy vis-a-vis the Balkans and the Med Area in the 1990s is extensive. See indicatively: Lesser, 2001; Coufoudakis, Psomiades & Gerolymatos, 1999; Constas & Stavrou, 1995.

[11] Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) *Greece's Participation in Peace-Keeping Missions in the Balkans*, online article, http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/balkans/gr_missions.html

[12] Hellenic Ministry of Defence (2004), *Defence White Paper 2004*, (available at the Hellenic Ministry of Defence in hard copy version, in Greek), p. 29.

Furthermore, Greece has help set up within the South Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) project a multinational engineering battalion with disaster relief and reconstruction vocation[13].

Although it's clear that when a crisis manifests itself turning violent in a hurry, it is infinitely more important to have boots on the ground since military missions have by definition a higher profile and therefore, command a higher political significance, the importance of non-military crisis management should not be overlooked or understated. Having said that, recent experience in the Mitrovica riots last March has shown that there is still a lot of ground to be covered by the Greek armed forces in the police function of peace support operations, with Greek units having inadequate quantity and quality wise anti-riot equipment and being as a result hard-pressed to cope with the disturbances[14].

At the level of crisis management, the Greek government supports the EU approach meaning that the military and civil aspects of ESDP should be developed on a parallel and equal basis given that they are integrated in a unified action plan. Greece contributes to the military leg of ESDP a force of 4700 men, 46 aircraft and 13 warships. Furthermore, it participates in the European on-call police force with 180 police officers, 20 of which are assigned to the rapid deployment police force[15]. Greece is also taking part in the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM as well as the UN Police mission in Kosovo[16].

The EU has already considerable experience and some successes in the field of conflict prevention. The EU's preventive diplomacy has a great scope for extending its action on the basis of international legitimacy and UN Resolutions. This action would be more effective if the EU coordinates its voice in international organizations further. The EU as the biggest donor of aid can further coordinate all its external actions to serve the aims of preserving and extending democratic practices, good governance and respect for Human Rights. Furthermore, the EU's greatest leverage in the field of conflict prevention is that the EU is perceived by its periphery and third countries as an area of security, rule of law, accountable democratic public institutions and protection for minorities (Coppieters et al., 2003, p. 11). Greece feels that EU conflict prevention efforts must be focused in specific volatile regions such as the Balkans and the Euro-Med area[17].

In the field of conflict prevention, Greece views very favourably the development of programs on a country by country basis and has already undertaken a very important development aid program with the countries of southeastern Europe using national funds and resources.
Greece supports wholeheartedly an increased cooperation with NGOs as this is an unobtrusive way of intervening in crisis situations and constitutes a risque-free policy. The Greek ministry of foreign affairs has had considerable experience and some resounding successes in its cooperation with NGOs in disaster relief and development aid and has created a special directorate to manage and finance such projects.

On the question of third countries' participation in EU CCM, Greece feels that these countries can contribute a great deal on account of their human and material resources, geographic location, experience and know-how. These countries are in a unique position to have an understanding of their region and neighbors and possess a wide range of diplomatic back channels, contacts and useful background knowledge. Suffice it to say that, having good relations with its neighborhood is a prerequisite for a country's participation in such an undertaking. Therefore, Greece sees as essential the need to draw up modalities and programs for the active engagement of third countries in the EU's efforts. In order to match third countries' resources with the requirements of the EU most efficiently, parameters and conditions for these contributions must be drawn. These contributions should strengthen the EU's project not simply add ballast to it. There will definitely be shortcomings in the EU's pool of resources so the additional contributions will be gladly received.

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[13] Ibidem, p. 27.
[14] Reports from the press indicate that a high pitched battle was fought to disengage the personnel of a Greek outpost from a mob of Albanian protestors see *To Vima*, 21 March 2004 (in Greek).
[15] Ibidem.
[16] Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), *Greece's Participation in Peace-Keeping Missions in the Balkans*, online article, http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/balkans/gr_missions.html
[17] Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003), *The Priorities of the Greek Presidency*, online article, http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/the_presidency.html

On a parallel note, Greek experience suggests that it is easier for small countries to perform crisis management functions in highly charged and volatile political environments. Smaller countries are generally perceived as being impartial. This small and harmless, unobtrusive approach can be very helpful in reducing tensions in crisis situations.

On the question of focus, Greece favours a more regional approach for the EU's crisis management focusing on the Union's periphery namely the Balkans and the Mediterranean Basin. In 2003, the Greek government organized in the framework of the Greek presidency of the Council a seminar on EU civilian crisis management and the Mediterranean with very encouraging results.

Greece has encountered difficulties in participating in CCM mainly stemming from the fact that CCM is a wide ranging, all inclusive enterprise, engulfing sections of the government unconditioned to ways of the EU, posing new challenges for the bureaucracy and requiring interdepartmental cooperation on a scale never before encountered. Case in point, the ministry of Justice interpreted literally the provisions on promoting the Rule of Law as pertaining to some action within the boundaries of Greece. There is also a chronic shortage of qualified personnel thus making it difficult to create a personnel pool and meet the quotas set out in the capabilities conference[18].

The problems faced by the Greek public sector are familiar to many EU member-states-essential resources and manpower are scattered and scarce, the government agencies don't have procedures for working together, there is a lack of a central coordinating body. Admittedly the Greek public sector has been slow in adapting and taking in all these new tasks and challenges but is trying in recent years to make up for lost time. These deficiencies had reduced the Greek contribution to EU CCM to a symbolic level. But developments over the last couple of years, especially after the Swedish presidency report have been a real eye-opener for Greek government agencies and have qualified EU CCM as a growth industry with significant in-built potential.

The Justice Ministry has already taken up its first EU CCM mission by dispatching 10 judges in Georgia[19]. Although there is a considerable volume of experience in Greece on disaster relief and rescue operations the relevant secretariat for civil protection has not had much success in coordinating agencies much less undertake projects abroad, plagued with administrative and financing constraints. There has also been increased cooperation among the relevant ministries with the creation of an informal advisory board coordinating action[20]. Besides the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry, the Ministry with the most relevant experience is the Public Order Ministry, which has dispatched missions to Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM[21].

The aforementioned red tape deficiencies are in no way limited to Greece. The EU Political and Security Committee had to debate for 8 hours before coming up with an appropriate and jointly approved name for Operation Proxima and the relevant shoulder badges for the personnel involved in the operation[22].

The need to develop a credible EU CCM and conflict prevention policy has gained poignancy and urgency ever since the events of 9/11 and the so-called global war on terror. Greece feels that the best value for the EU's money lies in helping the countries in its periphery in combating terrorism not just as a symptom but by addressing the root causes of the problem. In this respect, the EU's CCM and conflict prevention policy can make a very important contribution especially through police and rule of law initiatives.

In the short to medium term, Greece views the development of EU CCM as an indispensable policy instrument, even more so in the light of experiences acquired in Iraq where the over emphasis in prosecuting and winning the war has cost the peace.

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[18] Interview with Greek Foreign Ministry officials.
[19] Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) *Greece and the External Relations of the EU with Georgia*, online article, http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/nak_georgia.html
[20] Interview with Greek Foreign Ministry officials.
[21] Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), *Greece's Participation in Peace-Keeping Missions in the Balkans*, online article, http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/balkans/gr_missions.html
[22] Interview with Greek Foreign Ministry officials.

To that effect, we should take steps to increase our effectiveness in the field. Adequate and timely participation in crisis management operations implies a mandatory character for personnel and resources commitments along the lines of similar NATO arrangements. This would have the effect of creating a single and comprehensive pool of qualified personnel suitable for a wide range of civilian missions. Another suggestion would be to institute a EU Partnership for Peace (PfP) program for crisis management with the countries of the European neighborhood. This would have the effect of harmonizing procedures and increasing cooperation among relevant agencies.

The creation of a military style unified structure for disaster relief teams governing equipment procurement, training etc., funded by the EU would go a long way towards increasing the operational mobility and effectiveness of these organizations in rescue and disaster relief tasks. A further suggestion would be the enhancement and enlargement of existing training modules for relevant personnel. This would have the effect of creating and fostering a common mindset and institutional memory.

By and large, the most important improvement of all would be the simplification of financing for EU CCM and conflict prevention policy, which would release a great potential of policy initiatives, which remain to this day bottled up in the dire straights of scarce financing.

EU CCM carries within it the potential of being an important policy instrument for the EU on its own right and not just an icing on the cake of CFSP/ESDP provided that we as Europeans take the necessary measures to that effect. The EU's added value in Crisis Management lies in its recourse to military and non-military assets (Kintis, 2002, p. 296). However, the institutional framework in place does not ensure the EU's unified reaction to a crisis. As long as the institutional set-up and coordination mechanism between military and non-military aspects of crisis management remain vague and efficiently challenged, the EU's expressed willingness to play an important role in Crisis management and Conflict Prevention will be treated with mistrust.

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